STEFANIE GRÜNE | Blinde Anschauung. Die Rolle von Begriffen in Kants Theorie sinnlicher Synthesis | Klostermann 2009


 

By Stefanie Grüne

In his very interesting and helpful commentary on my Blinde Anschauung. Die Rolle von Begriffen in Kants Theorie der sinnlichen Synthesis, Thomas Land raises two objections against my account of the role of the categories as rules for sensible synthesis. The first objection is that my “account of what it is to have the capacity to apply categories in judgement is mistaken”, the second is that my “claim that one can possess the capacity for sensible synthesis in accordance with the categories without possessing the capacity to apply categories in judgement […] is false”. Put together, these two objections amount to the fundamental criticism that my account of sensible synthesis “completely severs the connection with judgement that the categories seem to […] have”. I will reply to these objections in turn.

1. Land’s first objection

On my view, possession of a clear concept F consists in the capacity to classify Fs as Fs, which is the same as the capacity to apply F correctly in a judgement. Thus, whenever a concept is applied in a judgement, it is applied as a clear concept. This is true for empirical concepts as well as for the categories. To apply the category of, say, substance, in a judgement, is to make a judgement of the form “x is a substance”.[1] Against this view, Land objects that “the primary way in which a category is applied in judgement, according to Kant, is not by figuring among the concepts that constitute the matter of a judgement”. Instead, “the categories pertain to the form of a judgement”. In order to prove this, Land proceeds in two steps. First, he argues in the following way:

P1:The categories originate purely in the understanding.

P2:The understanding is, at bottom, a capacity for judgement.

C:The categories originate purely in a capacity for judgement.

Secondly, he asks why the categories should originate in a capacity for judgement. His explanation goes as follows:

P1:Understanding a judgement requires a grasp of its basic structure.

P2: To grasp the basic structure of a judgement is to apply the categories.

C: Understanding a judgement requires applying the categories.

Land argues for P2 in the following way: Predication, according to Kant, is the basic structure of judgement. The logical forms of judgement, specified in the table of judgement, are forms of predication. The fact that to each logical form there corresponds a category shows that the categories are concepts of logical forms of judgement or concepts of forms of predication. Thus, in order to grasp the basic structure of judgement, which is predication, one has to apply the categories. Furthermore, according to Land, on pain of a regress, grasping that a judgement exhibits a certain form of predication cannot mean that one entertains the proposition that the judgement exhibits such a form. Thus, even though in every judgement the categories have to be applied, contrary to my position, they cannot be applied as clear concepts.

In order to reply to this first objection, I will go through the premises of the two arguments. Whereas the first premise of the first argument is fine with me, I do not accept the second premise, which says that the understanding, at bottom, is a capacity for judgement. The section in which Kant characterizes the understanding as a capacity to judge has the title “On the logical use of the understanding in general” (A67/B92). From this logical use of the understanding Kant distinguishes a real use of the understanding.[2] That the understanding in its logical use is a capacity to judge, therefore, does not imply that the understanding tout court is, at bottom, a capacity to judge. By contrast, one important aim of the metaphysical and transcendental deductions is to show that the understanding is not only a capacity to judge (and to form concepts), but also a capacity for sensible synthesis. In § 15 of the B-Deduction for example, Kant writes:

[C]ombination […] is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, and, since one must call the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility, all combination […] whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition or of several concepts […] is an action of the understanding, which we would designate with the general title synthesis (B129ff.).[3]

In this passage, the act that is ascribed to the understanding is the act of combining or synthesizing. Furthermore, it is claimed that there are two different kinds of combination, namely combination of the manifold of intuition, which is what I call the act of sensible synthesis, and combination of concepts, which is the act of judging. Thus, in this passage the understanding is not characterized as a capacity to judge, but more generally as a capacity to combine or synthesize. This capacity comes in two forms, either as a capacity for sensible synthesis, or as a capacity to judge. At the end of the A-Deduction, Kant writes:

We have above explained the understanding in various ways—through a spontaneity of cognition (in contrast to the receptivity of the sensibility), through a faculty for thinking, or a faculty of concepts, or also of judgments—which explanations, if one looks at them properly, come down to the same thing. Now we can characterize it as the faculty of rules. This designation is more fruitful, and comes closer to its essence (A126).

I take it that one reason for saying that the characterization of the understanding as a faculty of rules is more fruitful and comes closer to its essence than the characterization as a faculty for judgements is that both acts of the understanding—the act of judging as well as the act of synthesizing sensible representations—can be described as acts that involve the application of rules or take place in accordance with rules. At the end of the A-Deduction, Kant is in need of such a more general characterization of the understanding, since, as Land and I agree, in the A-Deduction he gives a detailed description of the understanding’s non-judgemental involvement in sensible synthesis. But if the understanding, at bottom, is not a capacity of judgement, then the claim that the categories originate in the understanding does not imply that they originate in the capacity to judge. It might also imply that they originate in the capacity to synthesize sensible representations.

I now come to the first premise of the second argument: Making a judgement requires grasping the basic structure of judgements. Concerning this first premise, I would like to make two points. The first point is that I have trouble with understanding what grasping the basic structure of judgements in Land’s sense amounts to. Since the basic structure of a judgement is the form of predication that it exhibits, an example of grasping the structure of a judgement seems to be grasping that the judgement “This table is brown” is a categorical affirmative singular judgement. Still, according to Land, on pain of a regress such a grasp cannot consist in entertaining the proposition “‘This table is brown’ is a categorical affirmative singular judgement”.

Now, I do not understand what grasping that a is F might be, if it does not consist in entertaining the proposition that a is F. Perhaps one might claim that grasping in a non-propositional way amounts to having a certain knowing-how. Maybe grasping in a non-propositional way how to whistle amounts to knowing how to whistle. But this cannot be what Land has in mind, since knowing-how is a form of knowledge that is different from knowing-that.[4] Yet, according to Land, in order to understand a judgement one has to grasp that so-and-so.[5] Thus, if grasping in Land’s sense is grasping that so-and-so, then it cannot amount to having a certain knowing-how. I suspect that it is not possible to grasp that so-and-so without entertaining the proposition that so-and-so and that therefore the kind of grasping that Land has in mind does not exist. Still, maybe Land does not want to claim that grasping the structure of a judgement in a non-propositional way is grasping that so-and-so, even though his formulations suggests that this is his view. In this case he could claim that knowing how to ϕ and grasping the structure of ϕing in a non-propositional way amount to the same thing.

I find it rather difficult to give an argument in favour or against this view, because the disagreement in this case seems to concern the verbal matter of whether one is willing to describe knowing-how as a kind of grasping. Yet, one consideration that seems to speak against it is that this view, at least in my ears, does not sound very convincing in parallel cases. Does knowing how to swallow solid food, for example, imply grasping the structure of swallowing and applying concepts of this structure? Given that babies of very young age acquire this knowing-how, it seems rather implausible to assume that they have to apply any concept of swallowing. But if it is not generally true that knowing how to ϕ amounts to grasping the structure of ϕing, one needs an argument, which shows that it is true for the special case of judging that knowing how to ϕ amounts to grasping the structure of ϕing. In Land’s comment, such an argument is not given. Thus, as long as the first premise is not explained to me in more detail I am unsure what exactly it amounts to and I suspect that it is not true.

My second point is that in order to ascribe the claim to Kant that understanding a judgement requires such a special kind of grasping, one needs some exegetical reasons for doing so. Yet, in his comment Land does not give any textual evidence or argument for ascribing this view to Kant. Since Land assumes that grasping the structure of a judgement consists in applying the categories, one should expect to find passages in Kant’s work, where Kant claims that in order to understand a judgement we have to apply the categories. But as far as I know, Kant nowhere makes such a claim. Therefore, I do not think that one should attribute the first premise of the second argument to Kant.

What about the second premise, namely the claim that to grasp the basic structure of judgement is to apply the categories? Land argues for this claim in two steps. First, he assumes that grasping the basic structure of judgement in the sense at issue is to apply concepts of this structure, that is concepts of the logical form of judgement or concepts of the form of predication. Secondly, he takes Kant’s claim that to each logical form of judgement there corresponds a category to suggest that the categories are concepts of such forms. Thus, in order to grasp a judgement’s form of predication one has to apply the categories.

Here, I disagree with Land in the following respect: As I see it, the fact that to each logical form of judgement there corresponds a category does not show that categories are concepts of logical forms of judgement or concepts of forms of predications. As Land himself notes, the (unschematized) categories are concepts of an object in general. They are concepts by means of which we define what an object, in the most general sense, is. Thus, they are concepts of properties, which are instantiated by every object whatsoever. Clearly the logical forms of judgement are not properties, which are instantiated by every object whatsoever. By contrast, they are properties that, apart from judgements, are not instantiated by any object. Take for example the logical form of a categorical judgement and the corresponding category of a substance. Whereas apart from some judgements no object has the property of being of a judgement in which “subject and predicate constitute their matter” (Jäsche Logic AA 9:105), every object has the property of being “that which, in relation to the intuition, must be the ultimate subject of all other determinations” (A246) or being that which “does not exist otherwise than as subject” (B410). Thus the unschematized category has a different intension and a different extension than the concept of the logical form of a categorical judgement.[6]

Therefore, Land is wrong in writing: “[T]he categories are not only concepts of modes of predication. They are also characterized by Kant as concepts of an object in general”. As I see it, the categories are only concepts of an object in general, but not concepts of modes of predication. A concept cannot be both a concept of a mode of predication and a concept of an object in general, because these two concepts have different contents and extensions, and thus are different concepts. So, even if, contrary to what I have argued above, Kant believed that in order to understand a judgement, one has to grasp its structure and that therefore concepts of this structure are applied in every judgement, then these concepts would not be the categories, but concepts of the forms of judgement.

As I have already said, according to Land the assumption that the categories are concepts of modes of predication is established by Kant’s claim that to each logical form of judgement there corresponds a category.[7] So, I will end my discussion of the second argument with a short and very vague suggestion as to how to understand this claim if one does not understand it as saying that the categories are concepts of modes of predication. In so doing, I also want to counter Land’s accusation that I sever the connection between judgement and the categories.

When Kant talks of the form of judgement he can mean two different things. Since by ‘judgement’ he can either mean an act of judging or the content of such an act, the form of judgement can either be the form of the act of judging, or the form of the content of such an act. The relation between these two forms or structural properties is as follows: Because the act of judging has a certain form, its content has a certain form. As I have already pointed out above, the understanding performs not only the act of judging, but also another kind of act, namely the act of synthesizing sensible representations. According to Kant, the act of judging and the act of synthesizing sensible representations are structurally identical in the following sense: to every form of judging there corresponds a form of synthesizing sensible representations that is structurally identical to the corresponding form of judging. The act of sensible synthesis results in the formation of sensible representation of objects, more precisely, in the formation of intuitions.

The crucial point is the following: There are several properties which an object of intuition is represented as having solely for the reason that the act of sensible synthesis has certain structural features, namely structural features that correspond to and are structurally identical to features of the act of judging. For example, an object x is represented as having the property of being the ultimate subject of all determinations solely because the act of sensible synthesis by which the intuition of x is generated has a property which is structurally identical to a property of the act of judging, namely the property of judging in a categorical way that so-and-so. Now, the categories are concepts of exactly those properties which an object of intuition x is represented as having solely because the sensible synthesis by which the intuition of x is generated has features that are structurally identical to features of the act of judging. Thus, the categories correspond to the forms of judgement in the following sense: They are concepts of properties of objects of intuitions, which these objects would not be represented as having, if the acts of generating the intuitions of those objects did not have properties which are structurally identical to the forms of judging. Since on my view of sensible synthesis there is this correspondence between the categories and the forms of judging, I do not agree with Land that my account completely severs the connection between the categories and judgement.

According to Land, there is a second reason why understanding a judgement presupposes application of the categories: Judgement as such is dependent on intuition. To understand a judgement one must grasp the way in which judgement depends on intuition. More precisely, “to understand a judgement, one must grasp that the judgement in effect claims that there are possible intuitions which exhibit a certain kind of structure”. And “[t]o have this kind of grasp is to […] apply in judgement, the categories”. Therefore, in order to understand a judgement, one has to apply the categories.

Let me make three remarks concerning this reasoning. First, here again, grasping is grasping that so-and-so,[8] but does not consist in entertaining the proposition that so and so. Thus, the same objection that I have already made above applies again. Secondly, in order to substantiate his reasoning, Land only argues for the claim that judgement is dependent on intuition. He does not argue for the claim that according to Kant one has to grasp this dependency in order to understand a judgement and he does not mention any passage that speaks in favour of ascribing this view to Kant. As I see it, even if one accepts the claim that judgement is dependent on intuition, the further claim that in order to understand a judgement one has to grasp this dependency is neither systematically convincing, nor do I know of any evidence which shows that Kant held this view.

My last and longest remark concerns Land’s claim that judgement as such is dependent on intuition. He argues for this claim by pointing out that in order for a concept to have objective reality and to be a cognition, the concept must have “a suitable relation to sensibility”. He then continues:

But this means that a finite understanding is a capacity for cognition only if its acts are suitably related to actualizations of a sensible capacity. We might put this point by saying that, qua capacity for cognition, the capacity to judge is intuition-dependent.

As I have pointed out in Blinde Anschauung, Kant distinguishes between at least two different concepts of cognition, a stronger and a weaker one.[9] According to the strong notion of cognition, a cognition is a judgement, which contains concepts that have objective reality.[10] This is the sense of ‘cognition’ that Land has in mind. I completely agree with him that in order for a concept to have objective reality, it must relate to an intuition.

Still, Kant also has a weaker notion of cognition, according to which every conscious representation with a relation to an object is a cognition.[11] To have a relation to an object must be something weaker than having objective reality, because according to the Stufenleiter and the Jäsche-Logic every intuition and every concept is a cognition in the weak sense. In the Stufenleiter, ideas are explicitly added to the concepts and thus are cognitions in the weak sense, even though they do not relate to any intuition. Furthermore, Kant often speaks of problematic concepts, which are concepts, “the objective reality of which can in no way be cognized” (A254/B310). Since problematic concepts are concepts and since concepts are cognitions in the weak sense, problematic concepts are cognitions in the weak sense. Still we cannot show that they have objective reality, because we cannot relate them to intuition. Now, a judgement can contain concepts with objective reality as well as problematic concepts or ideas, that is concepts without objective reality. But this means that not all judgements are cognitions in the strong sense. Land is right to claim that all judgements are cognitions, if by ‘cognition’ he means cognition in the weak sense. Yet, cognitions in the weak sense are not dependent on intuition. By contrast, cognitions in the strong sense are dependent on intuition, but not all judgements are such cognitions. Therefore, contrary to what Land claims “judgement […] as such” is not generally dependent on intuition, and therefore it cannot be true that “to understand a judgement […] one must grasp the way in which judgement depends on intuition”.

To sum up, there are four different reasons why I do not believe that in order to understand a judgement one has to apply the categories. The first is that, without further explanation, I do not find the claim that to understand a judgement, one has to grasp its structure, systematically convincing. The second reason is that I do not see any reason to attribute this view to Kant. The third reason is that grasping the structure of a judgement does not consist in applying the categories, since the categories are concepts of an object in general, but not concepts of modes of predication. The fourth reason is that contrary to Land judgement in general is not dependent on intuition. Therefore, in order to understand a judgement one does not have to grasp that judgement is dependent on intuition and thus does not have to apply the categories.

2. Land’s second objection

Land’s second objection goes as follows:

Grüne’s thesis that one can possess the categories as obscure concepts without possessing the categories as clear concepts implies a falsehood. In Grüne’s view, to have the capacity to apply categories in judgement is to possess the categories as clear concepts. And to possess the categories as obscure concepts is to have the capacity for sensible synthesis in accordance with the categories. Therefore, her thesis implies that one can have the capacity for sensible synthesis in accordance with the categories without having the capacity to apply the categories in judgement.

So far I did not realize that my claim that one can possess the categories as obscure concepts without possessing them as clear concepts implies that one can have the capacity for sensible synthesis without having the capacity to apply the categories in judgement. I have to admit that this claim, at least initially, sounds stronger than what I want to claim and I am very grateful to Land for bringing this consequence to my attention. In order to make more precise what exactly my position is, it might be helpful to use Leibniz’ distinction between a proximate and a distal capacity (which he adopts from Aristotle). One has a distal capacity to ϕ, if and only if one belongs to a species that can learn to ϕ; one has a proximate capacity to ϕ,  if and only if one is able to ϕ given one is not disturbed by anything.[12] The capacity to apply categories in judgement, which amounts to the possession of the categories as clear concepts, obviously is a proximate and not a distal capacity. Therefore, what is implied by my characterization of the relation between categories as obscure concepts and categories as clear concepts can be stated more precisely in the following way: One can have the capacity for sensible synthesis without being able, given that one is not disturbed by anything, to apply the categories in judgement. By contrast, it is not implied that one can possess the categories as obscure concepts without belonging to a species that can learn to apply the categories in a judgement. In other words: My position implies that one can possess the categories as obscure concepts without having the proximate capacity to apply the categories in a judgement, but it does not imply that one can possess the categories as obscure concepts without having the distal capacity to apply the categories in a judgement.

But even with this specification, Land would still be dissatisfied, since he objects to the claim that one can have the capacity for sensible synthesis without having the proximate capacity to apply the categories in a judgement. Land agrees with me that one can use the categories in sensible synthesis[13] without having the proximate capacity to apply categories as clear concepts in judgements. Yet, as we have seen in the discussion of his first objection, according to Land the categories are applied in judgements not only as clear concepts, but also in another way, namely insofar as (for Land) making a judgement implies grasping its structure and grasping its structure implies applying the categories. I will call this application of the categories the structure-grasping application. What Land argues for in his second objection is the claim that the capacity for sensible synthesis in accordance with the categories depends on the (proximate) capacity to apply (in the structure-grasping sense of ‘application’) the categories in judgements. He argues for this claim in the following way:

First, the application of categories in sensible synthesis consists in grasping the structure, or form, of an intuition.

Second, this structure cannot be specified independently of the structure of judgement.

Clearly, in order to reach the requested conclusion, one needs a third premise, namely the premise that one grasps the structure of a judgement by applying the categories.

Let me go through these three premises in reversed order. As should be clear from my discussion of Land’s first objection, I do not accept the third premise. Since, on my view, the categories are not concepts of the structure of judgements, by applying them one does not grasp the structure of judgements. By contrast, I am sympathetic to the second premise. I completely agree “that the unity for which sensible synthesis in accordance with the categories is responsible cannot be specified without any reference to judgement”. Yet, I do not believe that in order to have an intuition one has to grasp that the unity of the intuition can only be specified in such a way. Especially, I do not agree that with regard to sensible synthesis “possession of the categories consists in the ability to grasp the structure, or form, of a representation”. And I do not believe that “[o]ne applies the categories in sensible synthesis, […] when one has an intuition and grasps its structure”.

As I point out in Blinde Anschauung, one possesses the categories as obscure concepts if and only if one has the capacity to combine sensible representations in a certain way, namely in such a way that the resulting representation is a representation of a substance that is an extensive and an intensive magnitude and that stands in causal interaction with other substances. The exercise of this capacity results in the formation of a representation of an object with such properties, but it does not consist in grasping that the represented object has such properties. Thus, Land and I have a very different conception of sensible synthesis and I do not accept Land’s first premise.

As I see it, there are two reasons that speak against Land’s first premise (namely the claim that the application of categories in sensible synthesis consists in grasping the structure of an intuition). I have already mentioned both of them in my reply to Land’s first objection.

(1) According to Land, grasping the structure of an intuition cannot consist in entertaining the proposition that the intuition has such and such a structure.[14] As I have already said in response to Land’s first objection, without further clarification I do not find the claim that there is the phenomenon of grasping in a non-propositional way systematically convincing.

(2) Land just assumes, but does not argue, for the claim that for Kant applying the categories in sensible synthesis consists in grasping the structure of an intuition. As far as I can see, Kant nowhere claims that applying the categories consists in grasping (in Land’s sense) the form of an intuition. Thus, I do not see a reason to ascribe this view to Kant. Furthermore, not only are there no passages in which Kant characterizes the function of the categories as rules for sensible synthesis in the way in which Land describes it, but there are several passages in which Kant describes the function of the categories as rules for sensible synthesis in a different way. He repeatedly claims that the function of concepts as rules for sensible synthesis is to form representations that have a certain unity or structure. For example, in the A-Deduction he writes:

Actual experience, which consists in the apprehension, the association, (the reproduction), and finally the recognition of the appearances, contains in the last and highest (of the merely empirical elements of experience) concepts that make possible the formal unity of experience […]. These grounds of the recognition of the manifold, so far as they concern merely the form of an experience in general, are now those categories. On them is grounded, therefore, all formal unity in the synthetis of imagination. (A124ff.)

In this passage Kant explicitly claims that application of the categories makes possible the formal unity of experience and that this unity is grounded on the categories.[15] Thus, contrary to what Land assumes, the function of the categories as rules for sensible synthesis is not to grasp the structure of an intuition, but more fundamentally, to form or generate a representation with such a structure. But if applying the categories in sensible synthesis does not consist in grasping the structure of an intuition, then the fact that this structure cannot be specified independently of the structure of judgement does not imply that in order to apply the categories in sensible synthesis one has to apply them in judgements. Therefore, I adhere to my claim that possessing the categories as obscure concepts does not imply the proximate capacity to apply them in judgements.

Notes:

[1] This does not imply that the category of, say, substance is applied in a judgement only in cases in which the predicate concept is the concept of substance. As I argue in Blinde Anschauung, the categories belong to the content of every empirical concept (243). Thus, whenever I apply an empirical concept in a judgement, I also apply all the categories that belong to the content of the empirical concept. At least, this follows, if one assumes, as I do, that whenever one applies a concept F in a judgement, all the concepts that are contained in F’s content are applied as well. On this view, when I judge for example that this animal is a dog, in applying the concept of a dog I also apply the concept of a substance that stands in causal interaction to other substances.

[2] See A299/B355 and On the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world, AA 2:393ff.

[3] See also B135.

[4] This, at least, is the dominant view. For a different conception of the relation between knowing-how and knowing-that, see J. Stanley & T. Williamson, ‘Knowing How’, Journal of Philosophy 98 (8) (2001):411–44.

[5] See for example the following passage, in which Land explains in which sense grasping a judgement requires applying the categories by comparing Kant’s position with Frege’s position: “To understand an atomic proposition (and, thus, to understand any proposition), one must grasp this structure; that is, one must grasp that the proposition is composed of the sense of an object-expression and the sense of a concept-expression“. See also footnote 8.

[6] In his comment, Land writes; “Thus, in the basic case, the category of substance would be applied in a judgement of the form ‘S is P’ even though the judgement is neither a case of ‘Substances are P’ nor a case of ‘S is a substance’. The fact that the content of the unschematized category of substance is specified by Kant as ‘first subject of predication’ might be taken to support this suggestion.” I do not see why the fact that the content of the category of substance is specified in this way speaks in favour of assuming that the category is applied in every judgement that has categorical form. If one bears in mind that the categories are concepts of an object in general, then the only plausible interpretation of the passage quoted by Land is to understand ‘subject’ not as ‘subject concept’, but as ‘object that falls under the subject concept of a judgement’. Otherwise, from the fact that the categories are concepts of an object in general, it would follow that all objects whatsoever would be subject concepts. And this clearly is not Kant’s view. But if the unschematized category refers to certain objects that fall under subject concepts, then it is not at all convincing to claim that grasping the structure of a categorical judgement consists in applying the concept of a substance.

[7] I assume that the passages that Land has in mind are, for example, B131 and B159.

[8] Land writes: “The idea is that to grasp the structure of an intuition is to understand that the intuition is the representation of an object; and to understand, further, that an object is something that theoretical cognitive judgements are about.” See also the passage I have quoted in the preceding paragraph.

[9] See Blinde Anschauung, pp. 27–30.

[10] See for example A155ff./B194ff. and AA 20:266.

[11] See A320/B376ff. and Jäsche Logic AA 9:91.

[12] G. W. Leibniz, ‘Quid sit idea’, in G. W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, ed. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, Darmstad and Berlin: Akademie-Verlag (1999), VI.4.b

[13] In Blinde Anschauung I reserve the term ‘concept application’ for the use of clear concepts in judgement. Therefore, I do not talk of applying the categories in sensible synthesis, but only of using them in sensible synthesis.

[14] Land does not explicitly claim that grasping the structure of an intuition cannot consist in entertaining the proposition that it has such and such a structure. Still for the following reason he seems to be committed to this view: According to Kant, judgements are either problematic, assertoric or apodictic judgements. To make a problematic judgement is to entertain a proposition without assuming the truth of the proposition. Thus for Kant, whenever I entertain a proposition I apply concepts in a judgement. But Land and I both assume that sensible synthesis is not a matter of application of concepts in a judgement.

[15] See also A112, A126ff., B161.

 

© 2014, Stefanie Grüne.

Stefanie Grüne is Wissenschaftliche Assistentin at the University of Potsdam, Germany and is currently pursuing a Habilitation. She obtained her Ph.D. degree in philosophy from the Humboldt Universität Berlin in 2007. Her work focusses on the history of early modern philosophy, especially Kant, and the philosophy of mind. Apart from her dissertation Blinde Anschauung (Klostermann, 2009) she has published ‘Is There a Gap in Kant’s B Deduction’ in International Journal of Philosophical Studies and various contributions on Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Sartre.  

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