New Work on Hegel (III): Hegel and Derrida


JOHANNES-GEORG SCHÜLEIN | Metaphysik und ihre Kritik bei Hegel und Derrida | Meiner Verlag 2016


By Jacco Verburgt 

This fine monograph, which is the trade edition of a slightly revised Ph.D. dissertation (Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2014), addresses and assesses important issues and desiderata relating to the Hegel-Derrida debate, not least of which is a rehabilitation of Hegel’s essentially metaphysics-critical approach (cf. e.g. p. 366). Notably, it reconstructs some grave limitations of Derrida’s reading of Hegel and ultimately even uncovers a downright failing (a Scheitern, not only a Fehlen of an actual or full implementation) of the deconstruction strategy when it comes to interpreting Hegel (to be sure, not necessarily in the case of other philosophers or authors), as Derrida himself seems to acknowledge, at least partially or implicitly, according to Schülein (cf. e.g. pp. 297ff.). That is to say, the failing of Derrida’s earlier strategy (roughly from the 1950s and 1960s) of an immanent-deconstructive, delimiting or destabilising, critique of Hegel’s allegedly closed and totalitarian (as well as bourgeois) metaphysical system—in Derrida’s well-known sense of a metaphysics of presence, which is largely inspired by the later Heidegger (cf. esp. pp. 45–62, 67–8 [note 80], and 365), and its so-called onto-theological and phonocentric character—would eventually provoke a turn, especially in Glas (a text from 1974), to what one might call an external-realist confrontation with Hegel (cf. esp. pp. 250, 363 and 369).
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On Irad Kimhi’s “Thinking and Being”, Or, It’s The End Of Analytic Philosophy As We Know It (And I Feel Fine)


IRAD KIMHI | Thinking and Being | Harvard University Press 2018


By Robert Hanna

Irad Kimhi’s Being and Thinking begins with “Parmenides’s didactic poem On Nature”, which, Kimhi says, “is the first work of philosophy, where this is understood as the logical study of thinking and of what is (being)” (p. 1). Indeed,

[o]ne can look to this poem for the origin of the very idea of philosophical logic—the idea of a study that achieves a mutual illumination of thinking and what is: an illumination through a clarification of human discursive activity in which truth (reality, aletheia) is at stake. Philosophical logic, so understood, is a first-personal engagement from within the activity of thinking, one which allows the articulation and comprehension of thinking to emerge out of itself. The personal, so understood, is the logical. It is the activity of the logical “I” […]. (pp. 1–2)

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Reply to Alberto Siani


SERENA FELOJ | Estetica del disgusto. Mendelssohn, Kant e i limiti della rappresentazione | Carocci 2017


By Serena Feloj

First of all, I wish to thank Alberto Siani for his generous discussion of my book and his stimulating remarks. His commentary gives me the chance to spell out some theoretical elements accounting for the background of my book on disgust.    

My theoretical take on disgust emerges, in accordance with my methodological premises, from a historical reconstruction of the debate revolving around the topic of disgust and of the ensuing philosophical tools devoted to its understanding. I am especially interested in the idea, familiar to Kantian scholars, that the main task of philosophy is to challenge common sense by means of unusual sounding questions. This can be conspicuously applied to disgust. Usually understood as a very common reaction, which is typical of our everyday life, the family of words revolving around disgust is often abused by language, especially when expressed in English. It is then quite easy to fall into a simplistic reading of disgust in the field of aesthetics. Generally taken as an outright negative category, artists, critics and also philosophers apply it more and more often to the interpretation of works in contemporary art. Clear examples are provided in this respect by the Viennese Actionism’s very controversial performances, but many other cases could be mentioned here.

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Psychologism and Apperception—Response to Callanan and McLear


WAYNE WAXMAN | Kant’s Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind | Oxford UP 2014


By Wayne Waxman

Kant’s Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind (henceforth KAIM) is the focus of the outstanding, much appreciated discussion pieces authored by John Callanan and Colin McLear. KAIM is the second of two volumes—the first being Kant and the Empiricists: Understanding Understanding (Waxman 2005) (KEUU)—of a single work on self and understanding in Kant and British empiricism. It comprises a four-chapter general introduction relating Kant to the empiricists as successive stages in the development of psychologism; a five-chapter Locke part; a five-chapter Berkeley part; a six-chapter Hume part; and a full volume devoted to Kant’s psychologism. Although written as a single, integral whole, each segment is cast so as to be readable on its own. Only when readers take issue with something I say about a philosopher in a part of the work subsequent to my treatment of that philosopher’s views are they urged to acquaint themselves with the scholarly case I make, say, in the Berkeley part, that supports something I say about Berkeley in the Hume or Kant part.

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