Sacha Golob on Dennis Schulting’s “Kant’s Radical Subjectivism”


DENNIS SCHULTING | Kant’s Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction | Palgrave Macmillan 2017


By Sacha Golob

In his new book, Kant’s Radical Subjectivism, Schulting provides a rigorous and persuasive account of the core themes of the Transcendental Deduction. I have learnt a great deal from this work, and I am sympathetic to many of its points. In this response, however, I think it will be most interesting to concentrate on two issues where Schulting and I disagree, and where that disagreement has important structural consequences. The first issue concerns the role of objectivity in Kant’s argument, the second the prospects for nonconceptualism. I shall begin by summarising Schulting’s stance on each. I will then explain where we differ and why it matters.
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“Kant and Cosmopolitanism” Reconsidered


PAULINE KLEINGELD | Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship | Cambridge University Press 2012


By Robert Hanna

What is cosmopolitanism? Notoriously, there is no comprehensive, analytic definition of the term as it is used in either ordinary or specialised (say, legal, political, or scholarly) language, covering all actual and possible cases. It is variously taken to refer to globe-trotting sophistication; to nihilistic, rootless, world-wandering libertinism; to the general idea of ‘world citizenship’; to a single world-state with coercive power; to a tight federation of all nation-states, again with coercive power; or to a loose, semi-coercive international federation of nation-states and related global institutions concerned with peace-keeping, criminal justice, human rights, social justice, international money flow and investment, or world-trade, like the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the (plan for a) World Court of Human Rights, the World Bank, or the World Trade Organization.

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Guido Frilli on Alfredo Ferrarin’s “Il pensare e l’io. Hegel e la critica di Kant”


ALFREDO FERRARIN | Il pensare e l’io. Hegel e la critica di Kant | Carocci Editore 2016


By Guido Frilli

The core theoretical argument of Alfredo Ferrarin’s Il pensare e l’io is that the fundamental divergences between the Hegelian and the Kantian conceptions of reason can be appreciated only by considering an essential and often overlooked continuity. This continuity pertains to the ambivalent relationship between thought and the thinker; or, more properly, between reason as a universal force or transindividual power, and subjective or individual thinking as the sole ground upon which such a power can appear and know itself as such. According to Ferrarin, this continuity is one of shared problems more than of common solutions; but it is critical for grasping both Kant’s and Hegel’s standpoints on reason, as well as making better sense of their essential disagreements. For both, thinking exists only as embodied qua the thinking of an ‘I’, while at the same time it precedes and transcends subjective thinking. Reason is the self-production of truth; it cannot become my reason without corrupting itself. Nonetheless, in order to become self-conscious and at home in its world, reason’s activity must decline itself in the first person. In the biblical terms employed by Hegel, logos becomes flesh; and it becomes flesh as the conscious thinking of an ‘I’. Reason is thus the locus of an unresolved tension between the impersonal and spontaneous force of self-determination, and the activity of a conscious subjectivity this force must embody.

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Elisa Magrì on Alfredo Ferrarin’s “Il pensare e l’io. Hegel e la critica di Kant”


ALFREDO FERRARIN | Il pensare e l’io. Hegel e la critica di Kant | Carocci Editore 2016


By Elisa Magrì

Hegelian readers are familiar with Hegel’s enthusiasm for Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, especially with his letters where he speaks of Kant’s philosophy as foreshadowing a new revolution.[1] Alfredo Ferrarin’s latest book on Hegel, Il pensare e l’io. Hegel e la critica di Kant (Thinking and the I. Hegel and the Critique of Kant) takes very seriously Hegel’s appraisal of Kant and, more than this, Hegel’s own philosophical revolution. Ferrarin clearly shows that Hegel’s project is in many ways indebted to Kant precisely where Hegel did not acknowledge it, and yet Hegel’s philosophical revolution is unprecedented in other respects that call for further attention. Ferrarin explores the problem of thinking and its relation to the ‘I’ starting with questions that apparently have little significance for Hegel: What is thinking? Is thinking the same as having thoughts? Does thought depend on an ‘I’ in order to be objective? Is the ‘I’ in Hegel equivalent to subjectivity?

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