By Efraín Lazos
Edgar Valdez’s thoughtful critique of my book centres on the main thesis of its initial chapter, Conceptos e intuiciones, namely, on the psychological independence between intuitions and concepts. This is, of course, a version of what has been known as the Heterogeneity Thesis. What I shall do here is, first, dwell and elaborate on what I take to be the most dramatic aspect of the psychological independence thesis that may be attributed to Kant, namely, its being metaphysical independence. I propose that Heterogeneity is best understood as metaphysical independence between concepts and intuitions. In the second part, I shall try and respond to the main worries expressed by Valdez on behalf of Kant and of some of his recent interpreters. That my reading of Heterogeneity seems too radical motivates the first two worries: on the one hand, a full commitment to independence might endanger the possibility of bridging the divide between concepts and intuitions; on the other, Valdez fears that genuine independence may be out of reach, given the intermingling of our representations. A third worry is that, although psychological independence stands opposed to a strict conceptualism about intuition, it does not provide an explanation for spatial or even geometrical unities.