Reply to Watt: Epistemic Humility, Objective Validity, Logical Derivability

 

DENNIS SCHULTING | Kant’s Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction | Palgrave Macmillan 2017


 

By Dennis Schulting

Robert Watt has provided an excellent précis of the main theme of my book, namely Kant’s radical subjectivism, for which I am extremely thankful. I could not have written a more succinct summary that captures the essence, give or take a few details, of what I take to be Kant’s metaphilosophical stance in the Transcendental Deduction (henceforth simply ‘the Deduction’). So I’m not going to repeat here in my own words what Watt wrote. Rather, what I am going to do is respond to the lingering questions that Watt has, in particular, as to (1) how I see the issue of “epistemic humility” and how this ties in with my thesis of radical subjectivism, and (2) why I think objective validity is not a feature of intuitions, making my position on nonconceptualism vulnerable, in Watt’s view, to being nothing more than a closet conceptualism. Another issue that Watt raises concerns what is probably the most controversial aspect of my reading of the Deduction: namely (3) the contentious claim, which I defended at length in my previous book (Schulting 2012, henceforth KDA), that the categories are all a priori derived from the principle of apperception. Despite Watt’s serious reservations and Corey Dyck’s and Andrew Stephenson’s earlier misgivings, as well as Thomas Land’s doubts about this claim (Dyck 2014; Stephenson 2014; Land 2018; cf. by contrast Quarfood 2014), I remain firmly committed to it as what is in my view the only way to explain the systematicity claim that Kant makes with respect to the two tables, as well as the only way to understand what I call the reciprocity claim that is central to the Deduction (following Henry Allison). I realise I’m perhaps a lone voice in this in current Kant scholarship, but I take comfort in the knowledge of being in the august company of Klaus Reich and Michael Wolff, who both defend the idea.[1]

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Reply to Henny Blomme

 

KIYOSHI CHIBA | Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit | Walter de Gruyter 2012


By Kiyoshi Chiba

I want to thank Henny Blomme for the time and effort he spent on my book, and for his insightful comments (see here). His objections could be roughly divided into two groups: one concerns my distinction between realism and anti-realism, and the other concerns my interpretation of things in themselves. I will reply to them in turn.

1. The Distinction between Realism and Anti-Realism

One of Blomme’s main objections is that my distinction between realism and anti-realism is not useful, or even superfluous, for understanding Kant’s position. This objection is stated most concretely towards the end of Blomme’s critique (hereafter BC for short): Read more

Reply to Chris Onof

 

KIYOSHI CHIBA | Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit | Walter de Gruyter 2012


 

By Kiyoshi Chiba

Chris Onof’s detailed and penetrating objections (here and here) have clarified which parts of my book are unclear, misleading or hard to follow. I am pleased to have the opportunity to make my view and intentions clearer by responding to his objections. Onof’s objections concern various of my claims, explanations and arguments. In this short reply, I cannot examine them all, so I would like to concentrate especially on the following topics:

(1) The distinction between Cognition-Independence (CI) and Cognition-Transcendence (CT), and Onof’s favoured combination “CI and ¬CT”, (2) Onof’s objection to my interpretation of Kant’s solution of the antinomies, (3) the distinction between regress in infinitum and regress in indefinitum and … Read more

Henny Blomme on Kiyoshi Chiba’s “Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit”

 

KIYOSHI CHIBA | Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit | Walter de Gruyter 2012


By Henny Blomme

The goal of Chiba’s book is to answer the following question: Is Kant’s ‘transcendental idealism’ ‘realism’ or ‘idealism’? (Chiba 2012:2) Chiba concludes that Kant is an anti-realist: objects do not exist independently of our cognition. Chiba’s book contains a lot of interesting and precise analysis of parts of Kant’s argument in the Critique of Pure Reason. So it should be clear that the following remarks, although they express disagreement or reservation, are in no sense meant to hold back anyone from reading Chiba’s book. The contrary is the case: although I do not agree with everything Chiba affirms and defends, I can recommend his in its detail very informative dissertation to anyone who is interested in the attempt to link Kant’s theory to the contemporary ‘realism’ debate.

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