Chris Onof on Kiyoshi Chiba’s “Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit”; Part II

 

KIYOSHI CHIBA | Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit | Walter de Gruyter 2012


Part II

By Chris Onof

… continued

9. Potential and Actual Infinity

Chiba returns to the antinomy of pure reason once he has discussed the details of his particular brand of anti-realism, with a very interesting discussion of the difference between the regress in indefinitum, and the regress in infinitum. Chiba takes it that the regresses of the first type (illustrated by the second antinomy) are characterised by (where the description in words of the characterisation is followed by its formalisation in first-order logic):

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Chris Onof on Kiyoshi Chiba’s “Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit”; Part I

 

KIYOSHI CHIBA | Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit | Walter de Gruyter 2012


By Chris Onof

Kiyoshi Chiba’s book is a tightly argued and impressively well-researched interpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (henceforth TI) as a form of anti-realism about spatiotemporal objects. Chiba clearly has a thorough grasp of Kantian scholarship, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mathematics, and as a result presents a multi-layered analysis that has a wealth of interesting claims about Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (henceforth CPR), only a few of which I can discuss in this paper. I shall chiefly focus upon issues of disagreement between us, because where we agree, there is generally not much to be added to his thorough exegetical analysis.

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Précis of “Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit”

 

KIYOSHI CHIBA | Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit | Walter de Gruyter 2012


 

By Kiyoshi Chiba

The central question of my book Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit is: ‘Is Kant’s Transcendental Idealism a kind of realism or idealism?’ Realism is, roughly, the doctrine that objects exist independently of us (e.g. of our representation, consciousness, knowledge/knowability, cognitive capacity etc.). Idealism, by contrast, claims that objects are in a certain sense dependent on us; a prominent example is phenomenalism, a version of which claims that spatiotemporal objects are logical constructions out of sensations.

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