Hegelians, Kant’s Subjectivism, and The Myth of Realism—A Reply to Paul Giladi

 

DENNIS SCHULTING | On Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Subjectivism in the Transcendental Deduction‘, in Kant’s Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction | Palgrave Macmillan 2017

 


 

By Dennis Schulting

I thank Paul Giladi for his generous commentary on a chapter of my book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism that deals with Hegel’s critique of Kant and for suggesting a way forward for reading the notoriously controversial relation between the two greatest philosophers of modern times. I also apologise for having him wait so long, too long, for a response to his piece. But—to cut to the chase—for all his acuity in succinctly enumerating the criticisms that Hegel raises against Kant as they are standardly conceived, it seems to me that in his commentary, Giladi keeps perpetuating the Hegelian myth—a myth that originates in Hegel himself, in his less felicitous statements on Kant (Giladi appropriately quotes Encyclopædia, §§ 41z and 42z)[1]—that Kant’s transcendental or formal idealism fatally suffers from a psychological subjectivism, a charge that I explicitly sought to counter in my book. This is the myth that—and this is how Giladi himself puts it—“the structure, order, and unity of empirical reality are all derived from us and that thought and being are fundamentally separate from one another”, and that apparently because the objectively structuring categories are applied by us, they are not, or at least not ipso facto, really instantiated by the things themselves, in being itself so to speak, and thus not truly objectivating, but in the end merely subjective.

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Alberto Siani on Serena Feloj’s “Estetica del disgusto”

 

SERENA FELOJ | Estetica del disgusto. Mendelssohn, Kant e i limiti della rappresentazione | Carocci 2017


 

By Alberto L. Siani

“Beautiful things” may be “difficult”, as Socrates reminds us in Plato’s Hippias Major (304e7–9), but Serena Feloj’s Estetica del disgusto. Mendelssohn, Kant e i limiti della rappresentazione (‘Aesthetics of Disgust. Mendelssohn, Kant, and the Limits of Representation’) shows that ugly, or more precisely disgusting, things are not necessarily easier. Customary uncertainties on the philosophical status of beauty beset disgust too. Is disgust universal or subject-relative? What is its relation to knowledge and morality? Is it an immediate fact of nature or the result of education and culture? Does it have limits, and if so, which ones? Besides, disgust has troubles of its own. Is it something negative or positive? Is it something that can even be represented at all? There is, however, an important difference between beauty and disgust (or other forms of ugliness).

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REVIEW: Oliver Thorndyke’s “Kant’s Transition Project and Late Philosophy”

 

OLIVER THORNDYKE | Kant’s Transition Project and Late Philosophy. Concerning the Opus Postumum and Metaphysics of Morals | Bloomsbury 2018


 

By Robert Hanna

Sadly for Kantians, there are at least ten fundamental gaps in Kant’s Critical philosophy:

(i) formal vs. material in the theoretical philosophy and the practical philosophy alike,

(ii) a priori vs. a posteriori in the theoretical philosophy and the practical philosophy alike,

(iii) the non-manifest ontology of noumena vs. the manifest ontology of phenomena,

(iv) freedom vs. nature,

(v) scientific knowing (Wissen) vs. faith (Glaube),

(vi) understanding vs. sensibility (that is, concepts/conceptual content vs. intuitions/essentially non-conceptual content),

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Reply to Robert Louden and Alison Ross

 

RICHARD ELDRIDGE | Images of History: Kant, Benjamin, Freedom, and the Human Subject | Oxford University Press 2016


 

By Richard Eldridge

I am grateful to Critique and its editors for finding such accomplished philosophers and scholars as Robert Louden and Alison Ross to comment on Images of History, and I am grateful to both Louden and Ross for their detailed, accurate, and insightful remarks. Each of them characterises my aims and arguments well, and each of them aptly queries some central claims. I am pleased to have this opportunity to respond to their queries and to elaborate some of my lines of thought.

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