Hedging Around Objectivity: Reply to De Boer, Blomme, Van den Berg & Spigt

 

DENNIS SCHULTING | Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction | London: Palgrave Macmillan 2017


 

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This article was first published in Dutch in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 80 (2) (2018):363–378. The current English translation is a somewhat modified version of the original article. 


 

By Dennis Schulting

In this paper, I respond to critiques by Karin de Boer, Henny Blomme, Hein van den Berg and Joris Spigt of my book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). I address issues that are raised concerning objectivity, the nature of the object, the role of transcendental apperception and the imagination, and idealism. More in particular I respond to an objection against my reading of the necessary existence of things in themselves and their relation to appearances. I also briefly respond to a question that relates to the debate on Kantian nonconceptualism, more in particular, the question whether Kant allows animals objective intentionality. Lastly, I respond to one objection against my reading of Hegel’s critique of Kant. In my reply, I shall proceed thematically, addressing four main themes which are also central to my book: objectivity, the thing in itself, nonconceptual representational content and Hegel’s critique of Kant. This division also neatly corresponds to the focus of the different critics. Read more

Over een extreem fenomenalistische lezing van Kant

 

EMANUEL RUTTEN | Contra Kant. Herwonnen ruimte voor transcendentie | Utrecht: Kok, 2020


 

7 April: An English translation can be downloaded here

 

Door Dennis Schulting

Het komt niet vaak voor dat er in het Nederlands een filosofisch werk uitkomt dat gewijd is aan Kants theoretische filosofie. Er bestaat in het Nederlandse taalveld niet een heel grote traditie van Kant-onderzoek, althans niet als geïnstitutionaliseerde academische wijsgerige activiteit (een enkele welkome uitzondering daargelaten). Daar zijn allerlei oorzaken van historische en sociologische aard voor aan te wijzen. Maar feit is dat met name in Nederland serieus onderzoek naar de filosofie van Kant in de naoorlogse tijd het ondergeschoven kindje is gebleven. Aangezien Kants Kritiek nu eenmaal vaste prik is in het onderwijscurriculum, waant elke filosoferende onderwijzer zich vaak een Kant-expert. Je als Kantiaanse filosoof laten voorstaan op echte expertise wordt dan gezien als zelfwaan. Met zo’n mentaliteit gedijt serieus Kant-onderzoek vanzelfsprekend niet goed. Read more

Reply to Michael Friedman

 

HENRY E. ALLISON | Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. An Analytical-Historical Commentary | Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015


 

By Henry Allison

I wish to thank Michael Friedman for both his extraordinarily rich discussion, which amounts to a commentary of his own on the B-Deduction, and his generous comments about the import of my own work. Given the detailed nature of his reading of the text, with much of which I am in agreement, I shall not here attempt to comment on his account as a whole, since that would require a reply of almost equal length to his. Instead, I shall focus first on what he suggests is our major point of disagreement, namely, the conceptual-non-conceptual issue, and then consider some of our more specific differences.  

In recent years, the contrast between conceptualist and non-conceptualist readings has become the great divide in interpretations of the Transcendental Deduction. And, as Friedman notes, the focal point of the dispute is the note that Kant attaches to the first paragraph of §26 of the B-Deduction. It reads: Read more

Reply to Alison Laywine

 

HENRY E. ALLISON | Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. An Analytical-Historical Commentary | Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015


 

By Henry Allison

At the close of her comments, Alison Laywine notes that she “had the luxury of focusing on just […] one” aspect of my book and she chose my conception of a normative necessity. Assuming that a respondent should focus on a single aspect of a work under discussion, she has certainly chosen correctly, since this is a focal point of my account. Accordingly, I gladly accept her invitation to say more on the topic, and I am grateful for the opportunity that this has provided to clarify my view.

To begin with, by normative necessity I understand the kind of necessity that Kant attributes to empirical judgements or, in the language of the Prolegomena, to judgements of experience. That Kant attributes a kind of necessity to such judgements, despite their empirical or a posteriori grounding is indisputable.  For example, in a passage cited by Laywine, Kant writes: Read more