Hedging Around Objectivity: Reply to De Boer, Blomme, Van den Berg & Spigt


DENNIS SCHULTING | Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction | London: Palgrave Macmillan 2017



This article was first published in Dutch in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 80 (2) (2018):363–378. The current English translation is a somewhat modified version of the original article. 


By Dennis Schulting

In this paper, I respond to critiques by Karin de Boer, Henny Blomme, Hein van den Berg and Joris Spigt of my book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). I address issues that are raised concerning objectivity, the nature of the object, the role of transcendental apperception and the imagination, and idealism. More in particular I respond to an objection against my reading of the necessary existence of things in themselves and their relation to appearances. I also briefly respond to a question that relates to the debate on Kantian nonconceptualism, more in particular, the question whether Kant allows animals objective intentionality. Lastly, I respond to one objection against my reading of Hegel’s critique of Kant. In my reply, I shall proceed thematically, addressing four main themes which are also central to my book: objectivity, the thing in itself, nonconceptual representational content and Hegel’s critique of Kant. This division also neatly corresponds to the focus of the different critics. Read more

On Sebastian Rödl’s “Self-Consciousness and Objectivity”, Or, The Refutation of Absolute Idealism


SEBASTIAN RÖDL | Self-Consciousness and Objectivity: An Introduction to Absolute Idealism | Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2018


By Robert Hanna

Sebastian Rödl’s recent book, Self-Consciousness and Objectivity: An Introduction to Absolute Idealism, just like Robert Brandom’s A Spirit of Trust (Brandom 2019), Irad Kimhi’s Thinking and Being (Kimhi 2018) and Robert Pippin’s Hegel’s Realm of Shadows (Pippin 2018)—all of these books appearing within the last two years, like so many oranges tumbling out of a dropped shopping bag—is another first-rate example of what I have called “Pittsburgh/Chicago-neo-Hegelianism-with-a-serious-dash-of-neo-Aristotelianism” (see Hanna 2018). Rödl’s book, in turn, strongly encourages me to expand that handy label into “Pittsburgh/Chicago/Leipzig-neo-Hegelianism-with-a-serious-dash-of-neo-Aristotelianism”.

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Sacha Golob on Dennis Schulting’s “Kant’s Radical Subjectivism”


DENNIS SCHULTING | Kant’s Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction | Palgrave Macmillan 2017


By Sacha Golob

In his new book, Kant’s Radical Subjectivism, Schulting provides a rigorous and persuasive account of the core themes of the Transcendental Deduction. I have learnt a great deal from this work, and I am sympathetic to many of its points. In this response, however, I think it will be most interesting to concentrate on two issues where Schulting and I disagree, and where that disagreement has important structural consequences. The first issue concerns the role of objectivity in Kant’s argument, the second the prospects for nonconceptualism. I shall begin by summarising Schulting’s stance on each. I will then explain where we differ and why it matters.
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