On Schulting on Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Subjectivism in the Transcendental Deduction

 

DENNIS SCHULTING | On Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Subjectivism in the Transcendental Deduction‘, in Kant’s Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction | Palgrave Macmillan 2017

 


 

By Paul Giladi

I would like to begin by thanking Dennis Schulting for his warm invitation to write a response piece to the chapter in his new monograph that deals with Hegel’s critique of Kant. I learned a lot from his sensitive reflections on Kant and Hegel; in what follows, I hope my thoughts on the issue of Kant’s subjectivism are both coherent and repay Schulting’s kindness in sufficient German Idealist currency.

To Kantians, Hegel’s investigations into the logico-metaphysical structure of discursive thought have an insulting whiff of the metaphysical tradition Kant had painstakingly criticised; to many Hegelians, Hegel’s investigations into the logico-metaphysical structure of discursive thought represents the crowning glory of speculative idealism over Kant’s transcendental idealism. Historically, many seem content to either just dismiss Hegel summarily or uncritically follow him. However, as William Bristow nicely put it, we need to “develop and construct Hegel’s objection [to Kant] carefully and critically” (2007:4). Read more

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Robert Watt on Dennis Schulting’s “Kant’s Radical Subjectivism”

 

DENNIS SCHULTING | Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction | London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017


 

By Robert Watt

Dennis Schulting’s Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction (KRS) is full of big ideas. Its central claim is that Kant is a “radical subjectivist about the possibility of knowledge” (p. 35), and that recognising this is crucial if we want to save the Transcendental Deduction (henceforth ‘the Deduction’) from the “standard charges of incoherence, inconsistency, or relativism/scepticism” (p. 22). In the course of defending this claim, Schulting addresses a number of important issues regarding the interpretation of the Deduction, including the alleged logical gap in Kant’s argument, the continuing debate between conceptualists and non-conceptualists, and his own suggestion in his previous book Kant’s Deduction and Apperception: Explaining the Categories (KDA) that the Deduction contains a “logical derivation” of the Categories from self-consciousness.
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